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Abstract 
This study aims to evaluate the effect of regulatory corporate governance mandates on the valuation of 
equity-issuing firms in the U.S. Using a matched sample, we examine how the Exchange Listing 
Requirements, specifically, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), generally, affect IPO valuations. Board 
structure compliance provides no consistent valuation benefit. We find some evidence of negative 
effects for firms whose board structure is significantly altered by Reform and among small firms. The 
absence of increased valuations post-Reform suggests that there is little to offset the loss of private 
control benefits that Reform represents (post-Reform insider ownership and founder involvement are 
lower) and, thus, at the margin, Reform creates incentives for some firms to stay private. While the 2012 
JOBS Act reduced the burden of registration, reporting and accounting requirements of SOX for small 
firms, it did nothing to change the board structure requirements of these firms. The results of this study 
together with those of Wintoki (2007) and Rhodes (2018) suggest that regulations pertaining to the 
board structure requirements of small equity-issuing firms should either be modified to allow more 
flexibility or repealed altogether. If lawmakers ultimately relax these requirements, future studies may 
focus on changes in board structures, private benefits of control, and the rates at which firms access 
public equity markets. 
Keywords: Initial Public Offerings, Corporate Governance, Regulation 
JEL classification: G32; G34; G38 
Introduction 
The U.S. financial and accounting scandals of the early years of the 21st century (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, 
HealthSouth) spurred an increased interest in corporate disclosure and reporting and in corporate 
governance structures. They raised the question of whether existing governance structures were 
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characterized by rent extraction rather than shareholder wealth maximization.  The passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) represented, in part, an adoption of the rent extraction view and represents a 
significant departure from the traditional form of federal securities regulation.  Historically, federal regulation 
had focused primarily on assuring the adequacy of corporate disclosures, rather than upon substantive 
corporate governance requirements (Romano, 2005).  While a significant portion of SOX is concerned with 
disclosure and the role of auditing firms in certifying disclosures, among the governance requirements of 
SOX are provisions requiring independent audit committees, restrictions on the purchase of consulting 
services from auditors, prohibition of loans to officers, and executive certification of financial statements.   
Even more extensive regulation of corporate governance structures arose from the calls for reform that led 
to SOX but are outside of its actual provisions.  On February 13, 2002, before the final passage of SOX, the 
SEC called for the major stock exchanges to review their governance requirements (Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2007).  This led to the development of governance rules more extensive than those contained in 
SOX itself.  Similar rules were submitted by the NYSE and NASDAQ during 2002 and approved by the SEC 
in November 2003.  Among the governance provisions included in these exchange listing requirements (ELR) 
were: 
1. All firms must have a majority of independent directors. 
2. The requirements for independence were made more rigorous than previous definitions. 
3. The compensation, nominating, and audit committees of the board of directors must consist of 
independent directors. 
4. All audit committee members must be financially literate and at least one member must have 
accounting or related financial management expertise. 
5. In addition to its regular sessions, the board should hold additional sessions without management. 
Early literature suggested a relation between board structure and firm value with smaller (Jensen, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996) and more independent boards (Baysinger and Butler, 1985) contributing to firm value.  
However, as Bhagat and Black's (1999) review of the early board structure literature suggests, these were 
never unambiguous conclusions and are, arguably, contrary to the weight of the evidence.  Nonetheless, 
SOX and the ELR (henceforth collectively referred to as Reform) effectively codified elements of this view by 
requiring certain minimum levels of board independence for publicly traded firms (See SOX subsection 301, 
NASD Rule 4350(c), and NYSE Rule 303A). 
While the relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation has been a topic of interest in the 
recent financial literature (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Bebchuk and Cohen, 
2005; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009), as has interest in the general corporate 
governance effects of the SOX (Jain and Rezaee, 2006; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Litvak, 2007; 
Wintoki, 2007; Zhang, 2007; Li, Pincus, and Rego, 2008; Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner and Nanda, 2015; 
Bradley and Chen, 2015; Guo and Masulis, 2015), and its influence on the going private/dark decision (Engel, 
Hayes, and Wang, 2007; Marosi and Massoud, 2007; Leuz, Triantis, and Wang, 2008; Li, 2014) there has 
been little examination of this in the context of equity-issuing firms.  Our objective is to fill this gap in the 
literature by focusing on the effects of the corporate governance reforms on the valuation of equity-issuing 
firms at the IPO. 
We are particularly interested in examining the impact of these changes on firm valuations, as opposed to 
IPO initial returns or pricing (e.g., Johnston and Madura, 2009). While initial returns (or underpricing) reflect 
the reward to investors associated with participating in an IPO and “money left on the table” by issuers and 
underwriters, valuations instead reflect the direct impact of regulatory corporate governance reforms on 
overall shareholder wealth. Because issuers often ultimately benefit from such intentional underpricing, it is 
sometimes ambiguous whether, overall, shareholders are better or worse off when underpricing changes as 
a result of a regulatory change like SOX.1  On the other hand, because valuations are direct determinants of 
                                                             
1 There is empirical evidence that, while underpricing suggests IPOs are undervalued by underwriters relative to their 
aftermarket valuations, IPOs are actually overvalued by underwriters relative to their non-equity issuing peers (Purnanandam 
and Swaminathan, 2004). So, underpricing is not a reliable indicator of IPO valuations.  IPO valuation is addressed only rarely 
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shareholder wealth, shareholders are clearly harmed if valuations fall or clearly benefit if valuations rise as a 
result of a regulatory change. Thus, by examining valuations as opposed to initial returns, we hope to obtain 
a clearer picture of the impact of regulatory corporate governance reforms on IPO firms and their owners. 
This study is motivated by the existing theoretical and empirical literature, discussed in the next section, that 
suggests that Reform may have moved the typical IPO firm away from its optimal board structure and that 
the costs of compliance may deter issuers, particularly small firms, from accessing public equity markets. In 
addition, firms that choose to go public are forced to surrender some private benefits of control in order to 
comply with the requirements of Reform. 
Similar to Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner and Nanda (2015), Guo and Masulis (2015) and Bradley and Chen 
(2015), we utilize Reform as a natural experiment to test SOX and the ELR’s effect on IPO valuations. We 
take 5 years of post-Reform IPO data from 2005-2009 and 6 years of pre-Reform IPO data from 1996-2001. 
We examine these samples on several summary statistics, documenting that the pre-Reform and post-
Reform IPO markets are different in important ways, which suggests that a self-selection effect is occurring 
post-Reform. We confirm that the bubble years of 1999-2000 are not the cause of these differences. To 
control for potential self-selection effects, we then construct a matching sample for our post-Reform 
subsample of IPOs from the pre-Reform subsample of IPOs using propensity score matching, where we use 
firm characteristics and market sentiment measures as our matching criteria.  We then use a new 
methodology to form relative valuation measures founded upon several commonly used accounting-based 
valuation ratios (e.g., price-to-earnings and market-to-book ratios). This methodology controls for both 
industry effects and the negative ratio problem, allowing a far more complete sample than is usually possible 
in IPO valuation studies.   
We find that for a subsample of firms where the deviation of actual board structure from predicted board 
structure is greater, there is some evidence of a negative effect from board structure compliance.  These 
results are generally consistent with the theoretical and empirical "one size does not fit all" board structure 
literature (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008; 
Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Reheja, 2007; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; and Linck, Netter, and Yang, 
2008).  We also find that, for some valuation measures, a general Post-Reform dummy, reflecting the effects 
of the remaining governance and the disclosure provisions of SOX, is negative and significant, suggesting 
Reform has actually decreased IPO valuations.2 The effect is stronger for firms whose actual board structure 
differs from predicted structure more.  The only evidence that Reform has increased IPO valuations is limited 
to small firms not subject to SOX Section 404 whose board structures were more significantly altered by 
Reform, suggesting firms exempt from this costly provision may have fared better than the general population 
of IPO firms.  We also document that the ownership structure of firms is significantly different for firms going 
public post-Reform, with post-Reform firms having substantially lower levels of insider ownership and board 
presence and decreased founder involvement (i.e. firms with high private benefits of control are less likely to 
go public post-Reform).  Thus, our overall conclusion is that the absence of increased valuations post-Reform 
suggests that there is little to offset the loss of private control benefits that Reform represents and thus that, 
at the margin, Reform creates incentives for some firms to stay private. 
The next section presents the literature review and our primary hypotheses.  The following section describes 
the data and its sources. The fourth section documents the differences in our pre-Reform and post-Reform 
samples, which suggest that Reform has affected the population of IPO firms. The fifth describes the 
methodology and the model for our primary analysis.  The following section presents the primary results and 
robustness tests and the last section concludes. 
Literature Review  
                                                             
in the literature, presumably because of the difficulty of data issues (see Kim and Ritter, 1999; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 
2004, and the discussion below). 
2 Our results compliment those produced by Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor (2011), who examine the market reaction to 18 
changes to corporate governance regulation related to CEO pay, proxy access, and CEO-chairman duality. Consistent with the 
notion that corporate governance practices are set so as to maximize shareholder wealth, they produce evidence of a negative 
stock price reaction for firms whose governance practices would be most significantly altered by the proposed regulations. 
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The theoretical (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; and Harris 
and Raviv, 2008) and empirical (e.g. Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Reheja, 2007; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 
2008; and Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008) literatures on optimal board structure have continued to expand 
with almost all reaching the conclusion that when it comes to board configuration "one size does not fit all."  
For example, young small high-growth firms with high monitoring costs might do better with a smaller more 
insider-oriented board, while old large slow-growth firms with low monitoring costs might do better with a 
larger outsider-dominated board.3 Thus, the literature has reached a point 180 degrees from the regulatory 
approach taken in Reform, which requires all publicly-listed firms, regardless of firm size, to structure their 
boards in the same way.  Compliance may also be costly in monetary terms, particularly for smaller firms.  
Linck, Netter and Yang (2009) find that post-SOX there are significant increases in director pay and overall 
director costs, especially among smaller firms. 
The literature suggests that Reform may have led the typical IPO firm (a young small growth firm) away from 
its optimal board structure. If so, then Reform presents a form of natural experiment where post-Reform firms, 
whose boards may be constrained by SOX and the ELR’s "one size fits all" approach, can be compared with 
matched pre-Reform firms, which were free to organize their board structure as they saw fit.  This provides 
an opportunity to test the relationship between board structure and firm value without the usual constraints 
of the endogeneity problem. If Reform moves board structure away from an unconstrained optimum, and 
board structure affects value, IPO valuations should be lower compared to pre-Reform matched firms.  If 
Reform moves board structures away from a rent extraction configuration, then IPO valuations should be 
higher compared to pre-Reform matched firms.  Thus, our first hypothesis is:  
HYPOTHESIS 1: 
H0:  The SOX and ELR board structure requirements have had no effect on IPO valuations. 
H1A:  The SOX and ELR board structure requirements have had a positive effect on IPO valuations. 
H1B: The SOX and ELR board structure requirements have had a negative effect on IPO valuations (one size 
does not fit all). 
We test hypothesis one by regressing IPO valuations on a Compliance Index variable that measures the 
extent to which IPO firms comply with the board structure requirements of Reform at the time of offering. A 
positive relationship between valuation and the Compliance Index supports H1A, suggesting that Reform 
moved IPO firms’ board structures away from a rent extraction configuration toward a structure that 
maximizes shareholder wealth. On the other hand, a negative relationship between the Compliance Index 
and firm valuation supports H1B, consistent with the theoretical and empirical research that argues that one 
size does not fit all when it comes to optimal board structure, and that constraining IPO firms’ board structures 
in this way reduces shareholder wealth. Finally, an insignificant relationship between the Compliance Index 
and firm valuation supports the null hypothesis, consistent with previous studies that have found that once 
the endogeneity of board structure is controlled for, that board structure is not consistently related to firm 
value (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Lehn, Patro, and Zhao, 2009). 
Reform also produces other valuation effects that must be considered.  SOX, particularly Section 404, also 
imposes significant monetary costs on listed firms.  Morgenstern and Nealis (2004) argue that disclosure 
requirements resulting from SOX have significantly increased the costs of being a publicly listed company 
and disproportionately so for smaller firms because compliance is largely the same for all firms, regardless 
of size, and involves significant fixed costs.  Iliev (2010), examining a sample of firms with public floats 
between $50-100 million, finds the marginal cost of compliance with SOX to be high. The marginal increase 
in audit fees for firms that comply is over $698 thousand higher than noncompliant firms. He also estimates 
total compliance costs (including outside vendor, internal labor, and internal non-labor costs in addition to 
audit fees) using proportions found in a FEI (2005) survey to be $2.3 million per year, so that indirect costs 
are slightly more than twice the audit costs. 
                                                             
3 Wintoki (2007) has documented that there is significant cross-sectional variation in the wealth effects around the dates of 
SOX and the ELR with older larger firms fairing better and firms with more growth opportunities and less certain operating 
environments doing worse in the general population of firms. 
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Reform also introduced a substantial change in the value of private control benefits between non-SEC-
registered unlisted firms and SEC-registered listed firms. Post-Reform, insiders wishing to list on a stock 
exchange (SEC registration is required for listed firms) must assemble a board of directors that is dominated 
by outsiders.  Or, in other words, insiders must be willing to surrender a significant portion of the private 
benefits of control in order to be a publicly traded exchange-listed firm.  Such considerations may affect public 
valuations as well, if they represent agency costs, but some may not.  Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz 
(2009) document that when private benefits of control are high, firms are less likely to cross-list in the U.S. 
because of the constraints on the consumption of private benefits that result from such listings, suggesting 
these concerns do indeed influence corporate behavior.  Thus, Reform has imposed significant monetary 
costs and reduced control benefits of insiders in publicly listed firms. 
The evidence increases that Reform has influenced corporate behavior in the general population of firms.  
Block (2004), Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007), Marosi and Massoud (2007), Leuz, Triantis, and Wang 
(2008), and Li (2014) all find that firms are more likely to go private or go dark (i.e. delist and deregister with 
the SEC) after the passage of SOX and that the characteristics of firms that do so are related to the costs 
that SOX imposes.  If Reform has made it more likely for a public firm to go private or, more commonly, go 
dark, that raises the question whether Reform has also made it more likely for a private firm to stay private 
or stay dark.   
Insiders would choose to go public if the firm’s value if public exceeds its value if private, including the value 
of private control benefits.  Reform changes this calculus in several ways.  It may cause the firm’s governance 
structure to deviate from its optimum.  It increases disclosure costs, significantly so for small firms.  It reduces 
the private benefits of control that remain when the firm goes public.  All these factors reduce the incentive 
to take a private firm public.  Coates (2007) argues that the benefit of SOX is that public companies will face 
a lower cost of capital as investors face a lower risk of fraud and theft losses and benefit from more reliable 
financial reporting, greater transparency, and greater accountability.  A lower cost of capital would imply that 
the valuation of the firm will be greater if expected cash flows are unchanged.  The cash flow effects of 
regulation-imposed corporate governance structures depend upon whether the original structures served to 
facilitate rent extraction or maximized shareholder value.  Increased disclosure costs and a less than optimal 
regulation-imposed governance structure mean that expected cash flows will fall for public companies.  Of 
course, the one size fits all structure of regulatory corporate governance might be an improved governance 
structure, which could increase expected cash flows.  Thus, whether the public valuation of a firm rises or 
falls would indicate whether the benefits of a lower cost of capital offset the cash flow effects of compliance 
and regulatory corporate governance.   
Private control benefits are not necessarily a part of this calculus, however.  It depends upon the extent to 
which they represent agency costs that are included in valuation.  Some private benefits of control are 
valuable to insiders, but not necessarily costly to shareholders.  To offset the decline in these types of private 
control benefits for firms going public, it would be necessary for public valuations to rise post-Reform for the 
effect of Reform on the going public/staying private decision to be neutral.  That is, for Reform not to deter 
IPOs at the margin, valuations must be higher post-Reform to offset the loss of control benefits that do not 
represent agency costs.   
Since we are also interested testing the effect of these other elements of Reform on the valuation of IPO 
firms, our second hypothesis is: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: 
H0:  Reform, in general, has had no effect on IPO valuations. 
H2A:  Reform, in general, has had a positive effect on IPO valuations. 
H2B:  Reform, in general, has had a negative effect on IPO valuations. 
 To test hypothesis two, we form a Post-Reform dummy that equals one for firms that go public post-
Reform and zero for those firms that go public pre-Reform. If there is a positive relationship between the 
Post-Reform dummy and firm valuation, that supports the idea that Reform has increased firm valuations by 
reducing agency costs and thereby reducing firms’ costs of capital (Coates, 2007). A negative relationship 
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between the Post-Reform variable and valuation suggests that the costs of compliance and/or the impact on 
the private benefits of control outweigh any positive effects on the cost of capital. An insignificant relationship 
between the Post-Reform dummy and valuation suggests that either Reform, in general, has not impacted 
firm valuations or that the positive effects on cost of capital just offset the negative impact associated with 
the cost of compliance and/or private benefits of control. 
Research and Methodology 
Data 
Our initial dataset consists of two samples of IPOs, one prior to and another following the implementation of 
Reform, identified using the Thomson Financial Securities Data Company database (SDC). The pre-Reform 
sample is drawn from all U.S. issues between 1996 and 2001. We select 1996 as the lower bound on the 
pre-Reform date range because data necessary to this study must be collected from IPO prospectuses, 
which became available on the SEC’s EDGAR online database beginning with IPOs issued in 1996 
(www.sec.gov/edgar). The post-Reform sample covers all U.S. IPOs issued between 2005 and 2009. The 
post-Reform sample begins in 2005 because, though SOX was passed in 2002, most of the final compliance 
deadlines for the major regulations resulting from SOX and the ELR were in October 2004. As is standard in 
the IPO literature, we exclude regulated utilities and financial firms (SIC codes 4900-4999 and 6000-6999), 
unit offerings, American Depository Receipts, limited partnerships, IPOs with offer prices less than $5, and 
best efforts offerings. Applying these filters yields a post-Reform sample of 380 IPOs and a pre-Reform 
sample of 1588 IPOs. 
From SDC we also collect information on offering characteristics, including the offering date, offer price, 
number of primary, secondary and total shares offered, proceeds, listing exchange, and the identity of the 
lead underwriter. We obtain the first closing market price, number of shares outstanding after the offering 
and market return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) information is extracted from the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s website.4 Balance sheet and 
income statement data after the offering as well as SIC codes are collected from Compustat. Firm founding 
dates, used to compute firm ages, are obtained from Jay Ritter’s website along with information on 
underwriter rankings as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004).5  We compute valuation variables for other 
firms in each IPO’s industry using price information from CRSP and balance sheet or income statement data 
from Compustat. 
The final matched sample requires a significant amount of hand-collected information from prospectuses 
made available on the SEC’s EDGAR online database. From EDGAR, we collect information on shares 
outstanding prior to the offering as well as pre-offering balance sheet and income statement data because it 
is either unavailable or unreliable in SDC. To this information we add detailed data on ownership and board 
structure immediately after the offering, including the extent to which firms comply with the board 
independence requirements implemented by the exchanges following the passage of SOX. From 
prospectuses we also retrieve information on company founders, the use of the offering proceeds, and 
whether the firm has a dual-class common share structure. 
Comparing the Pre- and Post-Reform IPO Markets 
A number of authors have documented the decrease in the number of IPOs, and particularly small IPOs, in 
the United States following the end of the Internet IPO bubble (Zingales, 2007; Weild and Kim, 2009; Asquith 
and Rock, 2011; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2013; Gao, Ritter, and Zhu, 2013).  Our data confirm this pattern.   
The statistics in Table 1 report differences in the means of IPO characteristics between pre- and post-Reform 
firms over our sample period (1996-2001 and 2005-2009). Panel A reports differences including the bubble 
period (1999-2000) in the pre-Reform period and results in Panel B exclude the bubble period. Proceeds and 
                                                             
4 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 
5  https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/  
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market capitalization are adjusted for inflation and reported in 2009 millions of dollars.  Panel A shows that 
the post-Reform sample is composed of larger, older, more leveraged firms raising more 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample of Pre-Reform Offerings (1996-2001) versus Post-Reform 
Offerings (2005-2009) 
This table provides descriptive statistics (i.e. means) for the full sample of IPOs from 1996-2001 (Pre-Reform) and 2005-2009 (Post-
Reform) periods for a number of IPO characteristics.  Panel A includes the bubble period (1999-2000), while Panel B excludes it.  
Proceeds and market capitalization are in inflation-adjusted 2009 millions of dollars.  The table also tests for the equality of the sub-
sample means.  ***,**, and * indicate significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
money in the offering.6  Differences in the means of these characteristics are significant at 5% or 1% level. 
Results in Panel B confirm that the inclusion of the bubble period in the pre-Reform period does not drive the 
significant differences in the pre- and post-Reform samples. Additionally, the statistics suggest that there are 
differences in market sentiment between the two eras. Panels A and B report a significant difference in 
average initial returns and the cumulative value-weighted market return 30 days prior to the offering. Because 
valuations are sensitive to investor sentiment, even if firm characteristics were essentially unchanged post-
Reform, it would be necessary to control for the effects of sentiment as we are comparing firms over two 
different sets of market conditions.  In unreported results, we expanded our pre-Reform sample to include 
years 1986-2001 and our post-Reform sample to include years 2003-2011. The results are identical to those 
reported in Table 1 with the sole exception that leverage ratios do not differ between the pre- and post-
Reform samples over this extended data period. 
The importance of this evidence to our analysis is that it suggests that some type of selection effect is 
operative between our pre-Reform and post-Reform samples.  The rate at which firms go public (fewer firms 
do so post-Reform) and the type of firms that do (firms that go public post-Reform are larger, have larger 
offerings, are more levered, and are older) clearly differ.  Thus, to make any valid inferences regarding 
                                                             
6 Other authors have also noted a size effect related to regulation.  Utilizing a Japanese dataset over a period during which 
several deregulations took place, Takahashi and Yamada (2015) document that prior to deregulation, IPO firms are larger than 
private firms and smaller following deregulation. Their results are consistent with the notion that regulation prohibits small 
firms from accessing public capital markets. Dambra, Field and Gustafson (2015) likewise find that the number of small IPOs in 
the U.S. increased significantly following the passage of the JOBS Act, which substantially reduced regulatory burdens, 
including those in SOX Section 404, on firms with less than $1 billion in annual revenues. 
Differences in Averages 
               
 Panel A: Pre-Reform Sample Includes the Bubble Period (1999-2000) 
           Tests of Equality  
   Pre-Reform Sample   Post-Reform Sample  (p-values)  
 Proceeds   102.2    184.3    0.0001***  
 Market Capitalization   480.6    601.6    0.0155**   
 Debt/Equity   0.3058    0.5985    0.0034***  
 Debt/Assets   0.3207    0.4737    0.0001***  
 Age   12.6707    21.6053    0.0001***  
 Initial Return   0.3874    0.1236    0.0001***  
 
Cumulative market return 
30 days prior to offering   1.0246    1.0169    0.0009***  
 Number of Observations   1588    380       
         
 Panel B: Pre-Reform Sample Excludes the Bubble Period (1999-2000) 
           Tests of Equality  
   Pre-Reform Sample  Post-Reform Sample  (p-values)  
 Proceeds   93.5534    184.3    0.0001***  
 Market Capitalization   307.7    601.6    0.0001***  
 Debt/Equity   0.3738    0.5985    0.0269**   
 Debt/Assets   0.3747    0.4737    0.0005***  
 Age   15.0139    21.6053    0.0001***  
 Initial Return   0.1667    0.1236    0.0037***  
 
Cumulative market return 
30 days prior to offering   1.0302    1.0169    0.0001***  
  Number of Observations     935       380             
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valuation differences between the samples, and in particular for any effects of board structure compliance 
on valuations, it is necessary to control for this potential self-selection.  The markets in which firms go public 
also differ with initial returns and market returns prior to offerings lower post-Reform.  Thus, it will also be 
necessary to control for these differences in assessing the effect of Reform on IPO valuations. 
Methodology and model 
Constructing the matching sample 
Determining the impact of Reform on the valuation of IPOs issued post-Reform requires identifying and 
examining a comparable pre-Reform sample. Previous studies that examine the influence of Reform on 
various aspects of the IPO market have simply compared the full sample of post-Reform IPOs to all IPOs 
issued over some time frame prior to the implementation of Reform (e.g. Akhigbe, Martin, and Newman, 
2008; Johnston and Madura, 2009; Gao, Ritter, and Zhu, 2013).  Unfortunately, this method does not control 
for the potential self-selection bias that occurred post-Reform.  That is, the number of firms and the 
characteristics of firms that choose to go public is clearly different post-Reform, which suggests some firms, 
for whatever reason, likely self-selected out of the public markets post-Reform.  Thus, in order to compare a 
characteristic such as valuation pre- and post-Reform, it is necessary to address this potential selection 
effect. 
In addition to selection bias, it is important to control for variations in sentiment across the two markets. 
Otherwise, it is impossible to determine whether observed changes in IPO valuations post-Reform are the 
result of the impact of Reform on firms that go public or the result of changes in the pool of IPOs or differences 
in market sentiment.  We follow a widely accepted method of controlling for selection bias due to observable 
differences between comparison groups by creating a matched sample of pre- and post-Reform firms using 
propensity score matching. Controlling for relevant differences between the post-Reform (“treated”) and pre-
Reform (“control”) samples, a matched sample can produce an unbiased estimate of the impact of Reform 
(the “treatment”). 
Dehejia and Wahba (2002) note that propensity score matching is particularly useful for creating matched 
samples where the comparison groups differ in a variety of ways as it allows the researcher to match each 
“treated” firm to a “control” firm on multiple dimensions. When the dimensionality of differences between the 
treated and control groups is high, other matching methods are problematic because it is difficult to decide 
upon which dimensions to match and how to weight the relative importance of each matching dimension. 
Dehejia and Wahba (2002) demonstrate that propensity score matching resolves these problems as it 
produces a natural weighting scheme that generates unbiased estimates of the treatment effect. In addition, 
propensity score matching is well-accepted in the corporate finance literature. Several recent studies, 
including those by Boubaker, Rouatbi and Saffar (2017), Cumming, Grilli and Murtinu (2017), Masulis and 
Nahata (2011), Lee and Masulis (2011), Kaserer, Mettler and Obernberger (2011), Li and Zhao (2006), 
Hogan and Lewis (2005), Lee and Wahal (2004), and Villalonga (2004), use it to create matched samples. 
Please refer to Appendix A.1 for details of the propensity score matching procedure. The final sample 
resulting from this procedure is 380 post-Reform and 380 pre-Reform IPOs. 
Table 2 demonstrates that this selection method produces a pre-Reform control sample with characteristics 
similar to those of the post-Reform treated sample and virtually identical average propensity scores. Because 
there are no longer significant differences in average size, proceeds, leverage, age and market sentiment 
between the two samples, our analysis should be untainted by selection bias driven by
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observable characteristics and differing market conditions. Thus, our results should be driven by the impact 
of Reform rather than inherent differences in the characteristics of the pre- and post-Reform samples. 
Table 3 details the characteristics of the matched sample by year of issuance. First, the number of pre-
Reform sample firms (1996-2001) tends to load slightly more on 1996 and 1997 issues, as shown in Panel 
A. However, this is not surprising, as 1996 and 1997 have the second and third largest number of issues, 
and therefore, potential matching firms. Panel B shows that as a percentage of the total number of potential 
matching issues that occurred in each year, the pre-Reform sample is well distributed. Importantly, the pre-
Reform sample is not dominated by bubble period (1999-2000) issuers either in terms of raw numbers or as 
a percentage of the eligible matches by year. Panel B demonstrates that as a percentage of eligible matching 
firms by year, fewer sample firms come from the bubble period than any other year. Furthermore, the bubble-
period sample firms do not have significantly higher average initial returns or cumulative market returns than 
issues from other years. 
Measuring valuation: The dependent variables 
We focus on several accounting ratios as measures of valuation in our analyses. Following other IPO 
valuation studies (e.g. Kim and Ritter, 1999; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004), we examine both 
historical (pre-offering) and contemporaneous (post-offering) measures of valuation. Our pre-offering 
measures include price-to-earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), price-to-
sales, price-to-earnings, and pre-offering market-to-book ratios. The post-offering measures include price-
to-sales, price-to-earnings, post-offering market-to-book, enterprise value-to-EBITDA, and enterprise value-
to-sales. Refer to Appendix A.2 for details on the data sources and calculation of each component of the 
ratios. 
One of the weaknesses of prior IPO valuation studies using financial ratios is the need to eliminate firms with 
zero sales, or negative earnings per share, EBITDA or book values (e.g. a firm with a high price and negative 
earnings would have a high valuation relative to its earnings, but the price-to-earnings ratio would be highly 
negative, implying a very low valuation). This is a weakness because it substantially reduces sample size 
and more importantly may eliminate firms, which could alter the conclusions drawn from an analysis. We do 
not make such exclusions because they would eliminate young firms and firms in particular industries (e.g. 
pharmaceutical companies with limited or no historical revenues and high research and development costs). 
Furthermore, if we make such exclusions, we lose a substantial proportion of our sample. If we eliminate 
IPOs with zero sales and the firms matched to those IPOs, we lose 8.7% of our sample. Eliminating IPOs 
with non-positive EBITDA and matched firms removes 54.7% of our sample. If we drop IPOs with non-positive 
earnings and their matches, we lose 73.7% of our sample. Dropping IPOs with non-positive post-offering 
book value and the matched firms drops 7.6% of our sample. And if we drop all firms with zero sales, or non-
positive EBITDA, earnings or book value, we lose 76.8% of our sample.  Hence, we must develop another 
way of forming the valuation ratios that resolves the negative number problem. Given that we did not match 
firms on industry when we created our matched sample, we also need to control for industry effects in 
valuation.  
We resolve both problems by creating industry percentile rankings for each of the components of the standard 
accounting ratios. First, we calculate the percentile rank of each IPO’s inflation adjusted market capitalization, 
enterprise value, EBITDA, sales, earnings, and book value relative to all other firms in the IPO’s industry 
(based on the 2-digit SIC code) in the Compustat universe over all sample years (1996-2001 and 2005-
2009). The prices, shares outstanding, and accounting measures of each firm in the IPO’s industry are 
collected from Compustat for each year in the sample, where the prices are those on the date of the firm’s 
fiscal year end. Additionally, since we are comparing prices and accounting variables over several years, all 
numbers are inflation-adjusted by the Consumer Price Index prior to calculating the percentile rankings. Then 
we form ratios of the IPO’s market capitalization (or enterprise value) percentile ranking to each of its 
EBITDA, sales, earnings, and book value percentile rankings (both historical and contemporaneous). This 
method accounts for both variations in valuation by industry and the negative number problem. We use 
aggregate numbers, rather than per share numbers, to calculate the percentile rankings to ensure that 
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possible differences in the way that the per share accounting measures and prices are distributed do not taint 
the results.  
In addition to the individual ranking ratios, we create a parsimonious measure of valuation using factor 
analysis. One benefit of using a common factor is that it is less subject to random measurement errors. Table 
4 presents the results of this factor analysis. Panel A gives the correlations of the original valuation ranking 
variables. Panel B presents the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix. We use the first factor, designated 
VALUATION_F1, which has an eigenvalue of 3.348 and explains 37.2% of the variation in our  other valuation 
ranking measures, as an additional proxy for valuation. Panel C gives the correlations of this factor with the 
original valuation ranking measures. 
Testing the effect of reform compliant board structures 
Board structure refers to both the size and the composition of the board and its committees. We collect 
information on the size of the board and the audit, compensation and nominating committees, as well as the 
proportion of the board and committees made up of independent, inside, and related directors. Inside 
directors are those who are employed by the firm at the time of the offering.  Related directors are those who 
have some conflict of interest or relationship with the company that jeopardizes their ability to act 
independently of management. Post-Reform, each exchange lists such relationships that would prevent a 
director from qualifying as independent; thus, directors who are neither insiders nor independent are defined 
as related. Post-Reform, issuers generally name the directors who do and do not qualify as independent 
under the new listing rules. However, for IPOs issued pre-Reform, we must make determinations of 
independence by applying the independence requirements of the appropriate listing exchange to the 
information provided in the prospectus. To the extent that issuers fail to report relationships relevant to the 
determination of independence, we overestimate the extent of board and committee independence pre-
Reform. In addition to the previous board characteristics, we create two dummy variables, the first of which 
equals one if a venture capitalist holds a board seat and zero otherwise (VCBoardSeat), and the second of 
which equals one if a non-VC institutional investor holds a board seat and zero otherwise (InstBoardSeat). 
Using the information we collect on board structure, we estimate the extent to which issuers, both pre- and 
post-Reform, are compliant with the independence rules of the exchanges at the time of the offering with a 
Compliance Index that is formed following a method like that implemented by Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2007). This index ranges in value from zero to four, where firms complying with none of the board 
independence requirements have Compliance Index values of zero and those in complete compliance have 
index values of four. Refer to Appendix A.3 for details on the calculation of the Compliance Index.  
Additionally, we code a ControlledCo dummy variable equal to one if more than 50% of the voting power for 
the election of directors is held by an individual, group or another company, and equal to zero otherwise. The 
controlled company status is important because controlled companies are exempt from all the board 
independence requirements except the requirement that the board have a completely independent audit 
committee made up of at least three members.7 
Control variables 
The control variables included in the models for firm valuation can be grouped into ownership structure 
variables and other general control variables found by previous studies to impact firm valuations. We control 
for ownership structure because, in addition to the changes required by Reform, ownership structure is a 
method of monitoring firm behavior. The additional general control variables include offering proceeds, the 
ratio of secondary share proceeds to total offering proceeds, firm age, research and development and 
advertising expenditures for the last full fiscal year prior to the offering, total assets before the offering, 
underwriter rank, and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm lists on the Nasdaq and zero otherwise. 
Finally, we include industry control variables to capture any variations in firm values across  
                                                             
7 We explore the possibility that status as a controlled firm affects the relation between the Compliance Index and valuation by 
including an interaction between ControlledCo and the Compliance Index. The interaction effect is not significant and has no 
effect on the results, so it is dropped from the reported analysis. 
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industries that may not be captured in the dependent variables.8 Refer to Appendix A.4 for a more thorough 
discussion of the control variables utilized in the model presented in Equation 1 below. 
Methodology 
In order to test the impact of the board structure provisions of Reform and the resulting changes to corporate 
governance on IPO valuations (Hypothesis 1), we regress the industry ranking ratio of each accounting 
multiple on the Compliance Index and each of the control variables previously discussed.  The right-hand-
side of the regression for each accounting multiple is identical to that of the price-to-EBITDA ranking ratio 
below: !"#$%&'(	*+',+"&-.+	'/"0-"1	23	*'-,+4!"#$%&'(	*+',+"&-.+	'/"0-"1	23	56!7894 = ;< + >?@2A*.-/",+	!"#+B4 + >C@5DE2.#4 + >FD&ℎ+'H1'E2.#	4 +>IJ@E2.#	4 + >K!"%&E2.#	4 + >LD&ℎ+'D$&%-#+E2.#	4 + >MJ@62/'#N+/&	4 + >O!"%&62/'#N+/&	4 +	>P@2"&'2..+#@2	4 + >?<@5DQ2$"#+'	4 + >??5B+,Q2$"#+'	4 + >?C@ℎ/-'Q2$"#+'	4 + >?F6.2,0Q2$"#+'	4 +>?I8-'Q2$"#+'	4 + >?KR"(T'2,++#%)4 + >?LN+,V/&-2	4 + >?MW/%#/X	4 + >?O91+	4 + >?P8$/.@./%%	4 +>C<Y%+T'2,D*5B	4 + >C?V85B*	4 + >CC9#Z5B*	4 + >CF9%%+&%	4 + >CIY[V/"0	4 + ∑ >]!"#8$AA(]^_CK + `  
(1) 
To test Hypothesis 2, the general effect of Reform on IPO valuations, we simply replace the Compliance 
Index in Equation 1 with a Post-Reform dummy variable (taking on the value of one if the IPO was issued 
post-Reform and zero otherwise) and this produces Equation 2. 
We do not include the Compliance Index and Post-Reform dummy variables in the same equation because 
they are highly correlated (0.49 Pearson correlation coefficient, significant at the 1% level) and preliminary 
tests suggest that this collinearity affects the results. We run the regressions for Equations 1 and 2 for each 
ratio and the extracted valuation factor and for the natural log of each ratio.  All regression models report 
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Findings 
Univariate analysis of board structure and ownership 
We examine average differences in board and ownership structure pre- and post-Reform for our matched 
sample. Since Reform mandated changes in board composition, we expect there to be significant differences 
in board and committee independence across the samples. Table 5 confirms this expectation. The 
Compliance Index is 1.22 for the average pre-Reform issuer and 2.73 for the average post-Reform IPO. The 
difference in the means is significant at the 1% level. As would be expected, the individual components of 
the Compliance Index also vary across the samples.  
The percentage of the board composed of independent directors increased from 48.73% for the average pre-
Reform issuer to 61.67% for the average post-Reform issuer.  The percentage of firms with a majority of 
independent directors also increased from 45.8% in the pre-Reform sample to 71.3% in the post-Reform 
sample. The percentage of independent committee members likewise increased significantly. The largest 
change occurred in the percentage of independent nominating committee members, from 4.54% pre-Reform 
to 77.68% post-Reform. This is primarily because most pre-Reform issuers had no nominating committee 
and what few that did gave such responsibilities largely to insiders and otherwise related directors. The 
percentage of firms with completely independent committees also increased significantly post-Reform; the 
percentage of firms with a completely independent audit committee, compensation committee, and 
nominating committee increased 35.3%, 25%, and 65.3%, respectively.  In short, for the overall board and 
                                                             
8 We also attempt to include dummy variables to capture yearly effects. However, these variables are correlated with our 
variables of interest, the Post-Reform dummy variable and the Compliance Index. In addition, some of the sample partitions 
include as few as 40 observations and including additional control variables becomes problematic. Thus, they have been 
omitted because of multicollinearity and sample size concerns. 
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for each committee, independent directors represented a statistically significantly higher proportion post-
Reform.  Since we are comparing a matched sample, the evidence suggests that Reform did significantly 
change board structure and forces firms away from their preferred unconstrained board structures.  While 
Reform gave no specific directives regarding board seats held by venture capitalists and other institutional 
investors, we find that the proportion of board seats held by venture capitalists increases while the proportion 
of board seats held by other institutional investors decreases post-Reform. 
Panel B presents information on founder involvement and ownership structure.  The picture it paints is that 
firms that go public post-Reform have much lower private benefits of control than their pre-Reform matched 
counterparts.  Founders are less likely to be the CEO and more likely to be a non-executive, non-chair, non-
director blockholder post-Reform.  Thus, post-Reform the founder is less likely to be directly involved in the 
day-to-day operations of the firm.  Also, CEOs and non-CEO managers have significantly lower stockholdings 
post-Reform.  The holdings of all managers fall from 19.75% to 9.34%, those of CEOs fall from 12.2% to 
5.8% and the holdings of non-CEO managers fall from 7.79% to 3.61%.  On the other hand, the holdings of 
venture capitalists rise from 17.09% to 32.69%. A likely explanation for the increase in venture capitalist (VC) 
holdings and board representation post-Reform is that those firms that choose to go public following Reform 
are only doing so because of the presence of the VCs, who push the firms to go public so they can exit from 
their investments. That is, in the absence of significant VC control, these firms might not otherwise choose 
to go public because the costs outweigh the benefits. For the firms with significant VC holdings that go public, 
the private benefits of control are likely already relatively low because of the presence of the VCs in the first 
place. Thus, post-Reform insiders have a significantly smaller interest in and venture capitalists, presumably 
interested in cashing out, have a much larger interest in firms that choose to go public.  Or, the private control 
benefits of firms that choose to go public post-Reform are significantly smaller than their pre-Reform 
matched-sample counterparts.  This clearly suggests that private benefits of control, which have been 
diminished by the regulatory corporate governance imposed by Reform, do affect the type of firm choosing 
to go public post-Reform. 
Predicted Compliance Index 
The fundamental objective of this study is to evaluate the impact on the valuation of firms that were forced to 
alter their board structures as a result of Reform. Undoubtedly, our sample mixes firms that would have 
chosen to construct their boards in the same manner that Reform requires them to (call this Group 1) with 
firms that have had to change their board structure from what it would have been if the firm were not 
constrained.  For firms that have had to change their board structure, some may have been required to do 
so in a value increasing way (Group 2) and some have been required to do so in a value decreasing way 
(Group 3).  Again, the full sample may be a mixture of all three groups and the board structure consequences 
and other effects of Reform would be expected to differ across the three groups.  As a result, analysis on the 
full sample may produce results that are largely ambiguous because of these differing effects.9 Thus, we 
attempt to separate firms based on how, or if, Reform changed the firms’ unconstrained board structure.10 
To accomplish this, we create subsamples using a linear factor approach to predict the post-Reform firms’ 
compliance index. Specifically, we build a predictive model of our pre-Reform firms’ compliance indexes from 
a set of variables that would be expected to be related to board structure and then take the coefficients 
obtained to build a predictive model for the board structure of post-Reform firms. 
Our predictive variables are drawn from the corporate finance literature that has identified several factors 
affecting optimal board structure.  Insiders on a board are valuable where firm-specific information is 
important for monitoring and strategic advising. Proxies for these types of firms include measures of growth 
opportunities available to the firm, such as R&D expenditures, measures of firm complexity, such as firm size 
and age (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2009; Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja,  
                                                             
9 Unreported analysis on the full sample confirms this expectation. The Compliance Index is largely insignificant across all 
valuation measures. The Post-Reform variable is negative and significant in three instances, but only at the 10% level in two 
of those regressions. 
10 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of analysis. 
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2007; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008) and measures associated with less influential CEOs, such as non-
founder CEOs. Additionally, several theoretical and empirical studies in the governance literature suggest 
other firm-specific factors that lead to a higher or lower proportion of independent directors. Studies by 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Baker and Gompers (2003) and Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) 
suggest that board structure results from negotiations between a firm’s outside directors and its CEO. Thus, 
the more powerful the CEO, as proxied by CEO ownership in the firm, the lower the proportion of independent 
directors. On the other hand, measures of constraints on insiders’ influence, such as venture capital presence 
and underwriter rank, lead to a higher proportion of independent directors. In addition to many of the above 
referenced factors, Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008), find that leverage also significantly positively influences 
board independence. 
The model for the Predicted Compliance Index, with the coefficient values obtained, is thus: !"#$%&'#$	)*+,-%./&#	0/$#1 = 1.19+ 0.002 ∗ :&<	=1,#/$%'>"#? − 0.00004 ∗ B."C#').,(EFF#"	!"%&#) −0.004 ∗ HI# + 0.04 ∗ )=E	J*>/$#"	<>++K+ 0.15 ∗ )=E	EM/#"?ℎ%, + 0.38 ∗ Q)	R.&C#$ +0.02 ∗ S/$#"M"%'#"	:./C − 0.56 ∗ <#U'	'*	H??#'?       (3) 
We then calculate the difference between the Actual Compliance Index and the Predicted Compliance Index 
for our post-Reform sub-sample and sort the post-Reform firms on this difference.  We then examine 
subsamples of the lowest tercile of the differences (Actual – Predicted of 1.10 or less) and their pre-Reform 
matched counterparts and the highest tercile of differences (Actual – Predicted of 2.45 or more) and their 
pre-Reform matches. The lowest tercile subsample effectively constitutes Group 1 type firms (i.e. their board 
structure was not radically altered by Reform).  We would expect the compliance index to have little effect in 
this sub-sample.  The highest tercile subsample are firms whose board structure was changed by Reform 
and, presumably, constitutes some mixture of Group 2 (value increasing changes) and Group 3 (value 
decreasing changes) firms.  However, by separating out Group 1 firms, we may be able to measure whether 
Group 2 or Group 3 firms are more predominant in this subsample and shed light on the effects of Reform.  
If the Compliance Index coefficient is significantly positive, Group 2 firms predominate, if the Compliance 
Index coefficient is significantly negative, Group 3 firms predominate.  In the former case, regulatory 
corporate governance adds value; in the latter case, it destroys value, and, hence, provides some evidence 
that Reform may be deterring some IPOs. 
The effect of the Post-Reform dummy variable across the three groups is more complex to predict as it is 
measuring numerous benefits and costs of Reform, although one possibility is that the general effects of 
Reform are correlated with the effects of compliance.  On the cost side there are the costs of compliance, of 
which Section 404 is one of the most monetarily costly.  On the benefit side are informational benefits 
resulting from the rules applying to auditors, additional reporting, the internal control audit of Section 404 and 
the benefits of extending liability to executives by way of forcing them to certify the accuracy of financial 
information reported to shareholders.   
In addition to examining Group 1 separately from Groups 2 and 3, we also consider the differential impact of 
Reform on IPOs of different sizes. As previously noted, firms with less than $75 million in public float were 
exempted by the SEC from complying with Section 404 of SOX, which requires a management report on the 
internal control systems of the firm, management’s attestation of the report, and an auditor’s attestation. 
Section 404 is by far the most monetarily costly aspect of SOX compliance. As the costs associated with 
compliance are largely fixed while the marginal benefit is likely a function of firm size and since IPO firms are 
small relative to the universe of firms subject to Section 404, their costs are likely higher relative to the benefits 
derived. One reason to believe this to be true is that the U.S. government exempted small firms (those with 
less than $75 million in public float) from Section 404. The SEC extended this exemption from Section 404 
several times, the last through June 30, 2010. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act and Consumer 
Protection Act made the exemption permanent from Section 404(b), which requires the auditor attestation of 
the management report on internal control, by adding Section 404(c) to SOX.   
To test the impact of this on our results, we create separate samples of firms.  Small firms have less than 
$75 million in public float and hence the post-Reform firms in this sub-sample are not required to comply with 
SOX Section 404 during our data period.  Large firms have more than $75 million and hence the post-Reform 
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firms in this subsample are required to comply with SOX Section 404 during our data period. The implication 
is that SOX compliance costs will be higher for the post-Reform firms in the large firm sample, which might 
increase the negative effect of the post-Reform dummy on these firms.  We then repeat our analyses on 
these separate small firm and large firm subsamples. 
Results 
The analysis involving the Group 1 subsample (i.e. low Actual – Predicted difference, Reform did not move 
board structure) appears in Table 6 for the full Group 1 subsample and the large and small firm partitions of 
this subsample. The analysis involving the Group 2/3 subsample (i.e. high Actual – Predicted difference, 
Reform changed board structure) appears in Table 7 for the full Group 2/3 subsample and the large and 
small firm partitions of this subsample.11 
The results of Table 6 indicate that the Compliance Index is generally insignificant; there are no significant 
coefficients for the full sample and only the coefficient in the market-to-book value regression is significant 
(negatively, at the 10% level) in the large firm subsample. This is as expected since board structure is little 
changed among Group 1 IPOs.  Things are a little different for the small firm subsample. The coefficients on 
the Compliance Index in the price-to-sales and extracted valuation factor regressions are negative and 
significant at the 1% level, although the coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level in the market-to-
book value regression.  
The entirety of the Group 1 results suggests that firms receive little to no benefit in terms of investor valuation 
from being more compliant with the listing requirements resulting from Reform, even if Reform did not 
significantly alter their unconstrained board structures. If the mandated board structure following Reform was 
optimal for all publicly listed firms, we would expect a consistently and significantly positive coefficient on the 
Compliance Index across all valuation measures, particularly for the Group 1 firms.  The lack of a positive 
relationship is consistent with the “one size does not fit all” board structure literature. While there is one 
instance in which the Compliance Index is positive and significant in the small firm subsample, there are two 
other instances in which it is negative and significant. Thus, there is some mixed evidence that compliance 
with the board structure provisions of Reform may have reduced valuations for the smallest IPO firms, even 
among those firms expected to voluntarily structure their boards in a compliant way.  
The impact of the general consequences of Reform (e.g., costs of compliance, change in the private benefits 
of control and changes in the cost of capital) on IPO valuations should be captured by the Post-Reform 
dummy variable. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% level in only the price-to-earnings 
regression for the full Group 1 sample. It is never significant in the small firm subsample regressions and is 
negative and significant at the 5% level in three regressions for the large firm subsample (price-to-sales, 
enterprise-value-to-sales and the extracted valuation factor). This result provides evidence that firms not 
subject to Section 404 of SOX fare better than those that are, even if board structure is not significantly 
altered by Reform, and is consistent with claims that the compliance costs of Section 404 are a significant 
issue for many relatively small firms that are forced to comply with them. Taking the results on the Compliance 
Index and Post-Reform dummy together, we find no clear benefit from the regulatory corporate governance 
provisions of Reform and at least some evidence that valuations fall post-Reform among Group 1 firms, 
particularly for those subject to the costly Section 404 provision of SOX.  
The results for firms where Reform moved board structure significantly in Table 7 indicate that this subsample 
is dominated by Group 3 firms (i.e. compliance reduces value). The negative results are stronger than for the 
full sample in Table 6 (Group 1). The Compliance Index is negatively significant for the full Group 2/3 sample 
for the price-to-sales ratio, market-to-book ratio and the enterprise value-to-sales ratio (all at the 5% level) 
and for the small-firm subsample for the price-to-earnings ratio (5% level), market-
                                                             
11 The results including the coefficients and t-statistics on the control variables are omitted for the sake of space. Results 
including the control variables and detailed discussions are available upon request. 
Rh
od
es
 &
 L
ig
on
 / 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l J
ou
rn
al
 o
f F
in
an
ce
 &
 B
an
ki
ng
 S
tu
di
es
, V
ol
 8
 N
o 
2,
 2
01
9 
IS
SN
: 2
14
7-
44
86
 
Pe
er
-r
ev
ie
we
d 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 J
ou
rn
al
 p
ub
lis
he
d 
by
 S
SB
FN
ET
 w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
co
py
ri
gh
t h
ol
de
rs
. 
 
Page38	
Ta
bl
e 
6:
 D
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
Ac
tu
al
 a
nd
 P
re
di
ct
ed
 C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
In
de
x 
is
 in
 th
e 
Bo
tto
m
 O
ne
-T
hi
rd
 in
 S
am
pl
e 
(G
ro
up
 1
) 
M
ul
tiv
ar
ia
te
 O
LS
 R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
An
al
ys
is
 
Th
is
 ta
bl
e 
pr
es
en
ts
 re
su
lts
 o
f t
he
 m
ul
tiv
ar
ia
te
 re
gr
es
si
on
 a
na
ly
si
s 
of
 o
ur
 v
al
ua
tio
n 
ra
nk
in
g 
m
ea
su
re
s 
on
 o
ur
 te
st
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
, C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
In
de
x 
an
d 
P
os
t-R
ef
or
m
, a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
co
nt
ro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 re
la
te
d 
to
 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
e,
 fo
un
de
r i
nv
ol
ve
m
en
t, 
an
d 
ot
he
r I
PO
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
fo
r t
he
 s
ub
se
t o
f f
irm
s 
w
he
re
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
an
d 
ac
tu
al
 C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
In
de
x 
is
 fr
om
 th
e 
lo
w
es
t t
er
ci
le
 o
f t
he
 
fu
ll 
po
st
-R
ef
or
m
 s
am
pl
e 
(i.
e.
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
is
 1
.1
0 
or
 le
ss
). 
C
on
tro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 re
la
te
d 
to
 o
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
e,
 fo
un
de
r 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t, 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
IP
O
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
ar
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 e
ac
h 
re
gr
es
si
on
, b
ut
 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s 
an
d 
t-s
ta
tis
tic
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
co
nt
ro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 n
ot
 r
ep
or
te
d 
to
 s
av
e 
sp
ac
e.
  
W
ith
 th
e 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ex
tra
ct
ed
 v
al
ua
tio
n 
fa
ct
or
, V
al
ua
tio
n_
F1
, t
he
 r
es
ul
ts
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 a
re
 th
os
e 
w
he
re
 th
e 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
is
 th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
ar
ith
m
 o
f t
he
 o
rig
in
al
 v
al
ua
tio
n 
ra
nk
in
g 
va
ria
bl
es
. A
ll 
re
gr
es
si
on
s 
ar
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 o
rd
in
ar
y 
le
as
t s
qu
ar
es
 a
nd
 re
po
rt 
W
hi
te
’s
 (1
98
0)
 h
et
er
os
ke
da
st
ic
ity
-c
on
si
st
en
t 
st
an
da
rd
 e
rro
rs
.  
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 a
re
 fo
r 
pr
e-
of
fe
rin
g 
pr
ic
e 
to
 E
BI
TD
A,
 p
ric
e 
to
 s
al
es
, a
nd
 p
ric
e 
to
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
an
d 
po
st
-o
ffe
rin
g 
m
ar
ke
t t
o 
bo
ok
 a
s 
th
e 
pr
e-
/p
os
t- 
re
su
lts
 a
re
 s
im
ila
r 
an
d 
th
es
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ha
d 
be
tte
r 
go
od
ne
ss
 o
f f
it.
  
Fo
r 
ea
ch
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
an
d 
te
st
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n,
 th
e 
“F
ul
l” 
lin
e 
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
t-s
ta
tis
tic
s 
fo
r 
th
at
 te
st
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
 fo
r 
ea
ch
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e,
 th
e 
lin
e 
“S
m
al
l F
irm
” 
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
t-s
ta
tis
tic
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
su
b-
sa
m
pl
e 
of
 fi
rm
s 
ha
vi
ng
 b
el
ow
 $
75
 m
illi
on
 in
 p
ub
lic
 fl
oa
t (
w
hi
ch
 w
er
e 
ex
em
pt
 fr
om
 S
O
X 
Se
ct
io
n 
40
4 
du
rin
g 
ou
r d
at
a 
pe
rio
d)
, a
nd
 th
e 
lin
e 
“L
ar
ge
 F
irm
” p
re
se
nt
s 
th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
t-s
ta
tis
tic
s 
fo
r t
he
 s
ub
-s
am
pl
e 
of
 fi
rm
s 
ha
vi
ng
 a
bo
ve
 $
75
 m
illi
on
 in
 p
ub
lic
 
flo
at
 (w
hi
ch
 w
er
e 
su
bj
ec
t t
o 
SO
X 
Se
ct
io
n 
40
4 
du
rin
g 
ou
r d
at
a 
pe
rio
d)
.  
Sa
m
pl
e 
si
ze
s 
ar
e 
25
2 
fo
r t
he
 fu
ll 
sa
m
pl
e,
 4
0 
fo
r t
he
 s
m
al
l f
irm
 s
ub
-s
am
pl
e,
 a
nd
 2
12
 fo
r t
he
 la
rg
e 
fir
m
 s
ub
-s
am
pl
e.
  *
**
,**
, a
nd
 *
 
in
di
ca
te
 s
ta
tis
tic
al
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 1
%
, 5
%
, a
nd
 1
0%
 le
ve
ls
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
In
de
x 
Pr
ic
e/
EB
IT
D
A 
Pr
ic
e/
Sa
le
s 
Pr
ic
e/
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
M
/B
po
st
 
En
tV
al
/E
BI
TD
A 
En
tV
al
/S
al
es
 
Va
lu
at
io
n_
F1
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
Fu
ll 
0.
03
 
(0
.4
8)
 
-0
.0
6 
(-
1.
04
) 
0.
08
 
(1
.3
3)
 
-0
.0
7 
(-
1.
48
) 
0.
02
 
(0
.4
1)
 
-0
.0
7 
(-
1.
16
) 
-0
.0
1 
(-
0.
19
) 
Sm
al
l F
irm
 
0.
06
 
(0
.4
9)
 
-0
.5
3 
(-
3.
14
)*
**
 
0.
15
 
(0
.9
6)
 
 0
.2
7 
(2
.8
1)
**
* 
0.
33
 
(0
.7
6)
 
-0
.2
7 
(-
0.
58
) 
-0
.4
8 
(-
5.
75
)*
**
 
La
rg
e 
Fi
rm
 
 
0.
00
 
(0
.0
6)
 
-0
.0
3 
(-
0.
55
) 
0.
04
 
(0
.5
6)
 
-0
.1
0 
(-
1.
77
)*
 
0.
01
 
(0
.1
5)
 
-0
.0
3 
(-
0.
50
) 
-0
.0
2 
(-
0.
35
) 
Po
st
-R
ef
or
m
 
Pr
ic
e/
EB
IT
D
A 
Pr
ic
e/
Sa
le
s 
Pr
ic
e/
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
M
/B
po
st
 
En
tV
al
/E
BI
TD
A 
En
tV
al
/S
al
es
 
Va
lu
at
io
n_
F1
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
Fu
ll 
-0
.1
8 
(-
1.
40
) 
0.
05
 
(0
.4
3)
 
-0
.2
4 
(-
1.
84
)*
 
0.
03
 
(0
.2
6)
 
-0
.1
9 
(-
1.
48
) 
 0
.0
3 
   
(0
.3
0)
 
-0
.0
9 
   
(-0
.8
8)
 
Sm
al
l F
irm
 
-0
.0
3 
(-
0.
29
) 
0.
29
 
(1
.0
3)
 
-0
.2
0 
 (-
1.
11
) 
0.
03
 
(0
.2
0)
 
 0
.3
1 
  (
0.
75
) 
 0
.6
3 
   
(1
.4
5)
 
 0
.0
6 
   
(0
.3
3)
 
La
rg
e 
Fi
rm
 
 
-0
.1
7 
(-
1.
15
) 
 -0
.2
0 
(-
2.
18
)*
* 
-0
.2
3 
 (-
1.
44
) 
0.
12
 
(0
.8
7)
 
-0
.1
6 
(-
1.
05
) 
-0
.1
8 
   
(-2
.0
3)
**
 
-0
.2
4 
   
(-2
.1
1)
**
 
  
 
Rh
od
es
 &
 L
ig
on
 / 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l J
ou
rn
al
 o
f F
in
an
ce
 &
 B
an
ki
ng
 S
tu
di
es
, V
ol
 8
 N
o 
2,
 2
01
9 
IS
SN
: 2
14
7-
44
86
 
Pe
er
-r
ev
ie
we
d 
Ac
ad
em
ic
 J
ou
rn
al
 p
ub
lis
he
d 
by
 S
SB
FN
ET
 w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
co
py
ri
gh
t h
ol
de
rs
. 
 
Page39	
Ta
bl
e 
7:
 D
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
Ac
tu
al
 a
nd
 P
re
di
ct
ed
 C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
In
de
x 
is
 in
 th
e 
To
p 
O
ne
-T
hi
rd
 in
 S
am
pl
e 
(G
ro
up
 2
/3
) 
M
ul
tiv
ar
ia
te
 O
LS
 R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
An
al
ys
is
 
Th
is
 ta
bl
e 
pr
es
en
ts
 re
su
lts
 o
f t
he
 m
ul
tiv
ar
ia
te
 re
gr
es
si
on
 a
na
ly
si
s 
of
 o
ur
 v
al
ua
tio
n 
ra
nk
in
g 
m
ea
su
re
s 
on
 o
ur
 te
st
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
, C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
In
de
x 
an
d 
P
os
t-R
ef
or
m
, a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
co
nt
ro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 re
la
te
d 
to
 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
e,
 fo
un
de
r i
nv
ol
ve
m
en
t, 
an
d 
ot
he
r I
PO
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
fo
r t
he
 s
ub
se
t o
f f
irm
s 
w
he
re
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
an
d 
ac
tu
al
 C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
In
de
x 
is
 in
 th
e 
hi
gh
es
t t
er
ci
le
 o
f t
he
 
sa
m
pl
e 
(i.
e.
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
is
 2
.4
5 
or
 m
or
e)
. C
on
tro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 re
la
te
d 
to
 o
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
e,
 fo
un
de
r i
nv
ol
ve
m
en
t, 
an
d 
ot
he
r I
PO
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
ar
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 e
ac
h 
re
gr
es
si
on
, b
ut
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
 a
nd
 t-
st
at
is
tic
s 
fo
r t
he
 c
on
tro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 n
ot
 re
po
rte
d 
to
 s
av
e 
sp
ac
e.
  W
ith
 th
e 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ex
tra
ct
ed
 v
al
ua
tio
n 
fa
ct
or
, V
al
ua
tio
n_
F1
, t
he
 re
su
lts
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 a
re
 th
os
e 
w
he
re
 th
e 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
is
 
th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
ar
ith
m
 o
f t
he
 o
rig
in
al
 v
al
ua
tio
n 
ra
nk
in
g 
va
ria
bl
es
. A
ll 
re
gr
es
si
on
s 
ar
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 o
rd
in
ar
y 
le
as
t s
qu
ar
es
 a
nd
 re
po
rt 
W
hi
te
’s
 (1
98
0)
 h
et
er
os
ke
da
st
ic
ity
-c
on
si
st
en
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
.  
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 a
re
 fo
r p
re
-o
ffe
rin
g 
pr
ic
e 
to
 E
BI
TD
A,
 p
ric
e 
to
 s
al
es
, a
nd
 p
ric
e 
to
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
an
d 
po
st
-o
ffe
rin
g 
m
ar
ke
t t
o 
bo
ok
 a
s 
th
e 
pr
e-
/p
os
t- 
re
su
lts
 a
re
 s
im
ila
r a
nd
 th
es
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ha
d 
be
tte
r g
oo
dn
es
s 
of
 fi
t. 
 F
or
 e
ac
h 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
an
d 
te
st
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n,
 th
e 
“F
ul
l” 
lin
e 
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
t-s
ta
tis
tic
s 
fo
r t
ha
t t
es
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
 fo
r e
ac
h 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e,
 
th
e 
lin
e 
“S
m
al
l F
irm
” p
re
se
nt
s 
th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
t-s
ta
tis
tic
s 
fo
r t
he
 s
ub
-s
am
pl
e 
of
 fi
rm
s 
ha
vi
ng
 b
el
ow
 $
75
 m
illi
on
 in
 p
ub
lic
 fl
oa
t (
w
hi
ch
 w
er
e 
ex
em
pt
 fr
om
 S
O
X 
Se
ct
io
n 
40
4 
du
rin
g 
ou
r 
da
ta
 p
er
io
d)
, a
nd
 th
e 
lin
e 
“L
ar
ge
 F
irm
” p
re
se
nt
s 
th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
t-s
ta
tis
tic
s 
fo
r t
he
 s
ub
-s
am
pl
e 
of
 fi
rm
s 
ha
vi
ng
 a
bo
ve
 $
75
 m
illi
on
 in
 p
ub
lic
 fl
oa
t (
w
hi
ch
 w
er
e 
su
bj
ec
t t
o 
SO
X 
S
ec
tio
n 
40
4 
du
rin
g 
ou
r d
at
a 
pe
rio
d)
.  
S
am
pl
e 
si
ze
s 
ar
e 
25
2 
fo
r t
he
 fu
ll 
sa
m
pl
e,
 7
0 
fo
r t
he
 s
m
al
l f
irm
 s
ub
-s
am
pl
e,
 a
nd
 1
82
 fo
r t
he
 la
rg
e 
fir
m
 s
ub
-s
am
pl
e.
 *
**
,**
, a
nd
 *
 in
di
ca
te
 s
ta
tis
tic
al
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 1
%
, 
5%
, a
nd
 1
0%
 le
ve
ls
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
In
de
x 
Pr
ic
e/
EB
IT
D
A 
Pr
ic
e/
Sa
le
s 
Pr
ic
e/
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
M
/B
po
st
 
En
tV
al
/E
BI
TD
A 
En
tV
al
/S
al
es
 
Va
lu
at
io
n_
F1
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
Fu
ll 
-0
.0
3 
(-
0.
81
) 
-0
.0
7 
(-
2.
24
)*
* 
  0
.0
1 
(0
.1
6)
 
-0
.0
6 
 (-
2.
04
)*
* 
-0
.0
7 
(-
1.
13
) 
-0
.1
1 
   
(-2
.0
5)
**
 
-0
.0
4 
 (-
0.
98
) 
Sm
al
l F
irm
 
-0
.0
8 
(-
0.
97
) 
-0
.1
4 
(-
0.
89
) 
-0
.1
6 
   
 (-
2.
06
)*
* 
-0
.1
1 
(-
1.
83
)*
 
 0
.3
4 
   
 (1
.4
5)
 
 0
.2
7 
   
 (1
.0
3)
 
-0
.2
3 
   
 (-
2.
15
)*
* 
La
rg
e 
Fi
rm
 
 
-0
.0
3 
(-
0.
72
) 
-0
.0
4 
(-
0.
81
) 
 0
.0
5 
(0
.9
0)
 
-0
.0
7 
 (-
1.
41
) 
-0
.1
0 
(-
1.
49
) 
-0
.1
0 
(-
1.
60
) 
 0
.0
2 
(0
.3
3)
 
Po
st
-R
ef
or
m
 
Pr
ic
e/
EB
IT
D
A 
Pr
ic
e/
Sa
le
s 
Pr
ic
e/
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
M
/B
po
st
 
En
tV
al
/E
BI
TD
A 
En
tV
al
/S
al
es
 
Va
lu
at
io
n_
F1
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
C
oe
f. 
T-
st
at
. 
Fu
ll 
-0
.1
2 
(-
1.
03
) 
-0
.3
2 
 (-
2.
74
)*
**
 
-0
.2
1 
(-
1.
51
) 
-0
.1
7 
(-
2.
05
)*
* 
-0
.1
0 
(-
0.
51
) 
-0
.3
0 
(-
1.
62
) 
-0
.2
6 
 (-
2.
13
)*
* 
Sm
al
l F
irm
 
-0
.3
3 
(-
1.
18
) 
-0
.7
0 
(-
2.
09
)*
* 
-0
.6
3 
   
(-2
.4
8)
**
 
-0
.5
5 
(-
2.
28
)*
* 
 2
.1
9 
  (
3.
14
)*
**
 
 1
.8
2 
  (
2.
34
)*
* 
-1
.4
9 
   
(-4
.8
4)
**
* 
La
rg
e 
Fi
rm
 
 
-0
.1
5 
(-
1.
08
) 
-0
.1
7 
 (-
1.
19
) 
-0
.1
4 
(-
0.
81
) 
-0
.2
2 
  (
-1
.7
6)
* 
-0
.3
2 
(-
1.
50
) 
-0
.3
4 
  (
-1
.6
6)
* 
-0
.1
2 
   
 (-
0.
81
) 
Rhodes & Ligon / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 8 No 2, 2019 ISSN: 2147-4486 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
 
Page40 	
to-book ratio (10% level) and extracted valuation factor (5% level).  It is insignificant in all the large-firm 
subsample regressions.  
The Post-Reform dummy displays a similar pattern with negative significance for the full subsample for the 
price/sales ratio (5% level), the market/book ratio (5% level) and the extracted valuation factor (5% level) and 
for the large firm sub-sample for the market/book ratio (10% level) and the enterprise value/sales ratio (10% 
level). However, the negative impact of the Post-Reform dummy is more prevalent within the small-firm 
subsample; the coefficient on this variable is negative and significant at the 5% level in the price/sales, 
price/earnings, and market/book value regressions and negative and significant at the 1% level for the 
extracted valuation factor. On the other hand, it is positive and significant for the enterprise value/EBITDA 
(1% level) and enterprise value/sales (5% level) ratios in the small-firm subsample. Another point of interest 
is that the Post-Reform dummy variable was insignificant across all valuation measures for the Group 1 small-
firm subsample. Despite being exempt from Section 404, small firms whose boards are most significantly 
altered by the governance provisions of Reform (Group 2/3) are also more negatively impacted by the general 
provisions of Reform. We regard this as an important finding, particularly because it likely serves as another 
explanation for the dramatic drop in the number of small-firm IPOs post-Reform.  
For the Group 2/3 sample, particularly the full sample and small-firm subsample, the evidence strongly 
supports a negative relationship between IPO valuations and the Post-Reform variable, suggesting that the 
effects of Reform outside of the explicit governance requirements have reduced valuations. This result is 
consistent with hypothesis H2B; that is, the costs of compliance and/or the impact on the private benefits of 
control outweigh any positive effects Reform may have on firms’ costs of capital. Likewise, when Reform 
alters board structure, there is evidence that the Compliance Index reduces valuations within the full sample 
and small firms are most negatively impacted. Together these effects may deter IPO issuance at the margin. 
The implication of these findings is that Reform poses binding constraints on IPO firms, particularly small 
equity-issuing firms. Lawmakers appear to recognize these issues; the Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
(JOBS) Act of 2012 sought to reduce the registration, reporting and accounting burdens on small issuers 
(known as emerging growth companies or EMGs). Dambra, Field and Gustafson (2015) provide evidence 
that the JOBS Act has been beneficial to EMGs, leading to a 25% increase in yearly IPO activity. However, 
more work needs to be done; the results of this study combined with those of Rhodes (2018) and Wintoki 
(2007) suggest that the board structure constraints of Reform, which the JOBS Act did nothing to modify, are 
detrimental to some IPO firms. Accordingly, it makes sense to either modify the board structure constraints 
for small issuers or to repeal them altogether. If lawmakers ultimately relax these requirements, future studies 
may focus on how board structures are altered and the resulting valuation effects. 
Robustness checks 
We perform two robustness tests to address the potential impact of the financial crisis on the valuations of 
our post-Reform sample. First, we incorporate a financial crisis dummy, Fin Crisis Dummy, which is equal to 
one if the IPO took place between August 2007 and December 2008 and zero otherwise, into the analyses 
reported in Tables 6 and  7.  Second, we exclude the IPOs that occurred during the financial crisis (between 
August 2007 and December 2008) as well as their pre-Reform matched counterparts and re-conduct the 
analysis. Detailed discussion and the tabulated results of the robustness tests appear in Appendix B. 
The results on the Group 1 subsample are not dramatically altered as a result of these exclusions (see Tables 
B.1 and B.3 of Appendix B). The Group 2/3 results are more substantially affected (see Tables B.2 and B.4 
of Appendix B). Specifically, the negative impact of the Compliance Index on the small-firm subsample is 
tempered, although the negative effect is more pronounced in the large-firm subsample with the elimination 
of the financial crisis IPOs. The results on the Post-Reform variable still demonstrate a negative effect on the 
full Group 2/3 sample and the small-firm subsample. Overall, the results of the robustness tests are consistent 
with the results presented in the main analysis: where board structures are more significantly altered by 
Reform, there is more evidence of a negative effect on IPO valuations and these firms are more negatively 
impacted by the general effects of Reform outside of the board structure provisions. 
Conclusion 
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Utilizing a new methodology for measuring valuations, we find significant differences in board structure pre- 
and post-Reform in our matched sample of firms, suggesting that the board structure provisions of Reform 
impose binding constraints on issuers, but find virtually no evidence that compliance with these costly listing 
requirements increases firm valuations. We find some limited evidence of a negative effect of compliance 
with the board structure provisions of Reform. This negative effect is more pronounced among those firms 
whose board structures were most significantly altered by Reform and among small firms in our sample. 
Since the regulatory corporate governance structures imposed by Reform place significant constraints on 
private benefits of control, they may prove a significant inhibition to going public in firms where those rights 
are significant to insiders. We find that in our matched sample post-Reform IPO firms have much lower insider 
ownership and greater venture capital ownership than pre-Reform matched firms, suggesting that post-
Reform firms that go public do exhibit lower control benefits.  The corresponding absence of higher valuations 
post-Reform suggests that private benefits of control do not necessarily represent priced agency costs. 
With respect to the general effects of Reform, we find some evidence of a negative effect.  When board 
structures are least altered by Reform (Group 1 firms), the negative effect is concentrated among those firms 
subject to SOX Section 404. Alternatively, when board structures are more significantly altered by Reform 
(Group 2/3 firms), the negative effect is concentrated among small firms exempt from Section 404. While 
there is some evidence that enterprise value-based ratios are higher post-Reform among firms not subject 
to Section 404, the weight of the evidence even among these exempt firms suggests that the mandates of 
Reform outside of the board structure provisions have negatively impacted IPO valuations. 
We provide new evidence that while the regulatory corporate governance provisions of Reform constitute a 
significant interference with private benefits of control for firms that go public, they provide limited if any 
valuation benefit to such firms. In addition, we reveal that Reform, in general, appears to have a negative 
effect on IPO valuations, particularly among firms whose board structures are most significantly altered, but 
may have some positive effect on IPO valuations for firms that are exempt from SOX Section 404. Our results 
suggest that the firms that have opted out of the IPO market are those where the private benefits of control 
are likely the highest, who would have to alter their board structure in a value-decreasing manner, and for 
whom the monetary costs of compliance are likewise most significant. 
The policy implications of these findings are that the board structure requirements of Reform should either 
be modified for small issuers or repealed altogether. While lawmakers have made steps in the right direction 
with passage of the 2012 JOBS Act to relax some of the more costly provisions of Reform, nothing has been 
done to address the constraints of the board structure mandates. If policymakers eventually relax these 
requirements, future studies may evaluate the resulting changes in board structures, private benefits of 
control, and the rates at which firms access public equity markets.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Methodology and Model 
A.1 Propensity Score Matching Procedure 
We use a  propensity score matching procedure to create a matched sample of pre-Reform firms for each 
post-Reform firm in our sample. This begins with estimating the propensity score of each of the 380 post-
Reform and 1588 pre-Reform issues from a logistic regression predicting the probability that the IPO would 
have been issued post-Reform. In this regression, the dependent variable equals one if the IPO was issued 
following the implementation of Reform and zero if it was issued before Reform. Since we need to control for 
size, offering proceeds, leverage, age and market sentiment, the independent variables in the regression are 
inflation-adjusted market capitalization at the time of the offering, inflation-adjusted proceeds, the debt-to-
equity and debt-to-assets ratios at the first reporting date following the offering, firm age at the time of the 
offering, the issue’s initial return, and the cumulative value-weighted market return for the 30 trading days 
prior to the offering. We deliberately do not control for pre-offering ownership structure in our propensity score 
matching regression because we wish to determine whether the private benefits of control, as proxied by 
ownership structure, differ pre- and post- Reform.  Then, because we sample from the pre-Reform control 
sample without replacement and since the resulting sample could be sensitive to the order in which sampling 
is conducted, we randomize both the pre-Reform and post-Reform samples (as suggested by Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002). Finally, using the propensity scores from the first step, we match each post-Reform IPO to its 
nearest neighbor from the pre-Reform sample. We then hand collect the data necessary to complete this 
final sample, which is comprised of 380 post-Reform and 380 pre-Reform IPOs.12 
A.2 Measuring valuation: The dependent variables 
We utilize several accounting ratios as measures of valuation in our analyses. Following other IPO valuation 
studies (e.g. Kim and Ritter, 1999; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004), we examine both historical (pre-
offering) and contemporaneous (post-offering) measures of valuation. Our pre-offering measures include 
price-to-earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), price-to-sales, price-to-
earnings, and pre-offering market-to-book ratios. The post-offering measures include price-to-sales, price-
to-earnings, post-offering market-to-book, enterprise value-to-EBITDA, and enterprise value-to-sales. 
The price in each of the ratios is the firm’s market capitalization and is calculated by multiplying the firm’s 
offering price by shares outstanding following the offering.13 Historical EBITDA, sales and earnings per share 
are collected from income statements in the prospectus and are measured over the most recent full fiscal 
year prior to the offering. Earnings per share are converted into aggregate earnings by multiplying the per 
share values by shares outstanding prior to the offering. Book value pre-offering is the book value of 
shareholder equity taken from the most recent balance sheet prior to the offering. Book value post-offering 
is calculated as the sum of pre-offering book value of equity and the primary offering proceeds. 
Contemporaneous sales, earnings per share and EBITDA are taken from Compustat for the first reporting 
period following the offering. Earnings per share are converted into aggregate earnings by multiplying the 
per share values by shares outstanding after the offering. Enterprise value is calculated as (market value of 
equity + book value of debt – cash); it is calculated after the offering where the market value of equity is the 
product of the offering price and shares outstanding following the offering, and the book value of debt and 
cash are taken from Compustat for the first reporting period following the offering. Kim and Ritter (1999) 
suggest examining the enterprise value-to-EBITDA variable because it allows comparisons between firms 
                                                             
12 Note, our approach is not perfectly consistent with the theoretical foundations of propensity score matching because the 
independent variables are not truly “predictive” of whether an IPO is issued post-Reform or not (i.e. they are correlations, not 
causations). Nonetheless, we argue that this approach is operationally valid because it accomplishes the selection of a matching 
control firm in an arguably less arbitrary way than simply choosing one or two characteristics upon which to match. 
13 For robustness, we also use the first trading day’s closing price in place of the offering price in calculating the percentile 
ranking ratios. The results reported in the paper are based on the offering price, but the results based on the first trading day’s 
closing price are basically identical to those reported. 
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with varying degrees of leverage, as enterprise value is invariant to the cash raised by the offering and 
EBITDA is unaffected by leverage. 
In order to deal with the negative number problem that plagues the standard accounting-based financial 
ratios, we create valuation measures based on the industry percentile rankings of each component of these 
financial ratios. As discussed in the paper, we first calculate the percentile rank of each IPO’s inflation 
adjusted market capitalization, enterprise value, EBITDA, sales, earnings, and book value relative to all other 
firms in the IPO’s industry (based on the 2-digit SIC code) in the Compustat universe over all sample years 
(1996-2001 and 2005-2009). Then we form ratios of the IPO’s market capitalization (or enterprise value) 
percentile ranking to each of its EBITDA, sales, earnings, and book value percentile rankings (both historical 
and contemporaneous). Forming the valuation measures in this way controls for variations in valuation by 
industry and the negative number problem. We use aggregate numbers, rather than per share numbers, to 
calculate the percentile rankings to ensure that possible differences in the way that the per share accounting 
measures and prices are distributed do not taint the results.  
If a firm has a relatively high price and negative earnings, then its industry price percentile ranking will be 
relatively high while its industry earnings percentile ranking will be relatively low and the ratio of the two 
rankings will be relatively high. Thus, the high ratio accurately reflects the firm’s high valuation. To see this 
more clearly, consider a numerical example. We are interested in calculating the price-to-earnings ratio of 
IPO A using the method just described. IPO A’s inflation-adjusted market capitalization is $80 million and 
there are three other firms in IPO A’s industry over the sample period: Firm B with an inflation-adjusted market 
cap of $75 million, Firm C with an inflation-adjusted market cap of $70 million, and Firm D with an inflation-
adjusted market cap of $50 million. IPO A’s aggregate inflation-adjusted earnings over the year prior to the 
offering were -$14 million. Firms B, C, and D have inflation-adjusted earnings of $10 million, $12 million, and 
$9 million, respectively. Intuitively, we know that IPO A has the highest valuation relative to its earnings, 
followed by Firm B, Firm C, and then Firm D. However, if we simply take IPO A’s price-to-earnings ratio, we 
will get -5.71, suggesting that it has the lowest valuation of the four firms. As we now demonstrate, calculating 
the percentile ranking ratios corrects this problem. 
We first calculate the percentile ranking of market capitalization. We rank firms A, B, C, and D in order of 
their market capitalization, where the firm with the largest market cap is ranked first. In this case, that firm is 
IPO A. We then create the percentile ranking of market cap for each firm using the following common formula 
that indicates the percentage of values that fall at or below a particular value: Percentile Rank =((B + 
0.5E)/n)*100, where B equals the number of firms with values ranked below firm x, E equals the number of 
firms with values of the same ranking as x (using this definition, E will always equal at least 1 because it is 
necessary to count firm x as we are calculating the percentage of values that fall at or below a particular 
value), and n equals the total number of firms. In this example, the percentile rank for IPO A’s market cap 
would be 87.5%. The percentile rankings for firms B, C, and D are 62.5%, 37.5% and 12.5%, respectively.  
We then follow the exact same procedure to calculate the percentile ranking of earnings. Since IPO A has 
the lowest earnings, it has the lowest rank and hence, the lowest percentile ranking at 12.5%. Firms B, C, 
and D have earnings percentile rankings of 62.5%, 87.5%, and 37.5%, respectively. Finally, we form the ratio 
of the market cap and earnings percentile rankings for each firm. For IPO A that is: Industry Percentile 
Ranking of Market Cap/Industry Percentile Ranking of Earnings= 87.5/12.5=7. For firm B the ratio is 
62.5/62.5=1, for firm C it is 37.5/87.5=0.43, and for firm D it is 12.5/37.5=0.34. Thus, we see that this method 
corrects the negative number problem and accurately assigns IPO A the highest valuation.  The values for 
these ranking ratios will, of course, not be comparable to the original raw ratios, but will produce a reliable 
measure of relative valuation across firms that controls for industry effects. 
Again, we use this method to create valuation ratios for each of the historical and contemporaneous 
accounting measures previously discussed. If the industry percentile ranking for EBITDA, sales, earnings, or 
book value falls below the first percentile, we round it up to the first percentile. As a result, the ratio of rankings 
is bounded between 0 and 100. Because the sample’s ranking ratios tend to cluster, we use both the ratio 
and the natural log of the ratio in the analyses. 
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Whether or not our percentile ranking ratios accurately approximate relative valuation compared to the raw 
accounting multiples is important. In order to address this issue, we examine the correlations between our 
percentile ranking ratios and the raw multiples for only the subsamples where the raw multiples are 
meaningful, that is, where sales are non-zero and EBITDA, earnings and book values are positive. For 
example, the correlation between the percentile ranking ratio of price-to-sales and the raw price-to-sales 
multiple (where sales are positive) is 0.34191, significant at the 1% level; 726 of our 760 observations are 
used in the correlation. The correlations for all the percentile ranking ratios with the corresponding raw 
multiples are positive and significant at the 1% level. The remaining correlations are 0.27593 (price-to-
EBITDA), 0.42377 (price-to-earnings), 0.75153 (market-to-book post offering), 0.40149 (enterprise value-to-
EBITDA), and 0.25197 (enterprise value-to-sales). Thus, our percentile ranking ratio approach produces 
rankings that are relatively highly correlated with the meaningful raw multiples.  
We argue that the percentile ranking approach is preferable to restricting the sample to firms where the raw 
ratios are meaningful because less information is lost in the former approach. Censoring the data based on 
the dependent variable could introduce serious bias in our results. The observations where the raw 
accounting multiples are inaccurate because of the negative/zero number issue are likely to be those firms 
with the highest valuations in the sample. A quick test of the data confirms this expectation. For example, if 
one ranks the firms in the sample based on the highest price-to-sales percentile ranking and then deletes 
those firms where the raw multiple is inaccurate because sales are zero (34 observations), we lose primarily 
the firms with the very highest price-to-sales percentile ranking; twenty-five of the observations dropped are 
among the 35 highest valuations and all 34 observations dropped fall among the highest 100 valuations. The 
price-to-sales multiple is the multiple where we would drop the fewest observations because the raw multiple 
is inaccurate, so the problem is exacerbated for those multiples where we would have to drop a higher fraction 
of the sample. If we follow the approach of dropping observations because the raw multiple is inaccurate and 
the observations dropped are those which would have otherwise had the highest relative valuation in the 
sample, we introduce a bias into the sample, which would likely artificially inflate negative effects on firm 
valuations because we are only observing those firms with relatively lower valuations in the sample. We 
consider this a serious issue and thus argue that the percentile ranking approach is the preferable method 
of dealing with the negative number problem. 
A.3 Compliance Index 
Similar to the approach in Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), the Compliance Index is formed by first 
creating a series of four dummy variables, each of which represents compliance with a particular aspect of 
the listing exchange’s corporate governance listing requirements that followed the implementation of Reform. 
The four main governance restrictions the exchanges place on listing firms have to do with the composition 
of the board: 
1. Firms must have a board composed of a majority of independent directors. The first dummy 
variable equals one if independent directors make up more than 50% of the board, and zero 
otherwise.  
2. The audit committee must be composed of a minimum of three directors, and every member 
must meet not only the standard independence requirements of the exchange, but also the more 
stringent independence requirements of Rule 10A-3(b)(1) under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.14 The second dummy variable equals one if the audit committee meets both the minimum 
member and independence requirements, and zero otherwise. 
3. The compensation committee must be composed entirely of independent directors. The third 
dummy variable equals one if the compensation committee meets the independence 
requirement, and zero otherwise. 
4. The nominating committee must be composed entirely of independent directors. The fourth 
dummy variable equals one if the nominating committee meets the independence requirement, 
and zero otherwise. 
                                                             
14 Specifically, the director “must not accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the company other than 
for board service, and they must not be an affiliated person of the company,” as stated under Rule 5605-4 of the NASDAQ 
Equity Rules. The NYSE has the same listing requirement. 
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The Compliance Index is then the sum of these dummies, ranging in value from zero to four. Obviously, the 
more compliant the firm is with the independence requirements, the higher the Compliance Index. 
Though one might assume that the Compliance Index equals 4 for all IPOs issued post-Reform, this is not 
the case. This is because we measure compliance at the time of the offering and all of the exchanges grant 
phase-in periods for compliance to companies listing at the time of their IPO. Specifically, companies must 
have one independent director on each of the audit, compensation and nominating committees at the time 
of the offering, a majority of independent directors on each committee within 90 days of listing, and fully 
independent committees within one year. Companies are allowed one year from the time of listing to meet 
the majority independent board requirement. This phase-in period is the same across the NYSE, Amex and 
NASDAQ exchanges. 
A.4 Control Variables 
 A.4.1. Controlling for ownership structure 
In assessing Reform's board structure provisions’ effects on firm valuation, it is important to control for other 
sources of monitoring of firm behavior.  Ownership structure is thought to be an alternative source of 
monitoring, both in general and in the IPO context (e.g. Brennan and Franks, 1997; Stoughton and Zechner, 
1998). In addition, we are interested in the relative private benefits of control pre-Reform versus post-Reform 
and a common proxy for private benefits of control is ownership structure. Data on ownership structure is 
divided into the holdings of management, venture capitalists and private equity firms, all other institutional 
investors, and all other outside (non-employee) blockholders and directors. Management ownership 
(MgtHold) is defined as the percentage of equity retained by executive officers and employee-directors as a 
group. Note that this number does not include holdings by outside directors (such as venture capitalists with 
board seats). We further divide management ownership into the holdings of the CEO alone (CEOHold) and 
all other executive officers as a group (OtherMgrHold) to evaluate the relative importance of the ownership 
of each group. Venture capitalist holdings include the percentage of total venture capitalist (VC) and private 
equity fund blockholdings following the offering (VCHold). Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) consider any issuer 
backed by either a VC or private equity firm to be VC-backed. Venture capitalists and private equity funds 
are identified using annual volumes of Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital and Private Equity Sources. 
Ownership by other institutional investors (InstHold) reflects the total blockholdings of non-venture capitalist 
institutions and corporations. Though their presence is not as prevalent as that of venture capitalists, 
occasionally both private and publicly traded firms will be among the pre-offering owners of an issuer. This 
variable does not include holdings of firms owned solely by executive officers of the issuer. Notes to the 
ownership section of the prospectus indicate whether a blockholding entity is owned by an executive officer 
of the issuer and the holdings of firms owned by executives are included in the shares beneficially owned by 
that executive. Directors and blockholders who are neither employees of the firm nor associated with a 
venture capitalist or any other institution are also occasionally among the pre-offering blockholders and their 
holdings are reflected in the OtherOutsideHold variable. 
All ownership holdings are net of outstanding options and warrants exercisable within 60 days of the offering, 
which the SEC requires each firm to include in the shares beneficially owned by these individuals and entities. 
Options and warrants are excluded from the ownership holdings because we are interested in control rights 
at the offering and they may, and in some cases do, significantly artificially inflate pre-offering ownership that 
is diluted by the offering. 
From prospectuses we also collect information on company founders and whether the firm has a dual-class 
common stock structure.  To assess the role of founders, we code a series of dummy variables, CEOFounder, 
ExecFounder, ChairFounder, DirFounder, BlockFounder, each equaling one if the founder is the CEO, 
another executive officer, the chairman of the board, a director, or a non-employee, non-director blockholder, 
respectively.   
In addition, we want to identify firms with dual class stock structures because when voting rights differ from 
cash-flow rights, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2010) show that, holding voting rights constant, an increase in 
insider cash-flow rights strengthens firm performance, but holding cash-flow rights constant, an increase in 
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insider voting rights weakens firm performance. This clearly has implications for firm valuations.  A dual class 
share structure may also indicate that private benefits of control are higher.  Thus, we create a dummy 
variable, DualClass, which equals one if the firm has a dual class stock structure, and zero otherwise. 
A.4.2. Other control variables 
We include a number of control variables in our empirical models that may, or have been shown by previous 
studies to, influence IPO valuations. These control variables are the natural log of offering proceeds, 
Ln(Proceeds), the ratio of secondary share proceeds to total offering proceeds, SecRatio, firm age, Age, 
research and development and advertising expenditures for the last full fiscal year prior to the offering, RDExp 
and AdvExp, total assets before the offering, Assets, underwriter rank, UWRank, and a dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm lists on the Nasdaq and zero otherwise, Nasdaq.  
The natural log of offering proceeds controls for the size of the offering and was found by Keloharju and Kulp 
(1996) to be significantly positively related to market valuations. The ratio of secondary share proceeds to 
total offering proceeds will likely negatively impact valuations because when the SecRatio is high, existing 
shareholders are selling a larger portion of their holdings and this sends a negative signal to investors about 
firm value per the Leland and Pyle (1977) signaling theory. Firm age is used in a number of valuation studies. 
Younger firms are more risky, but they often have higher market-to-book ratios than more mature firms 
because of their potential for growth.  
We control for R&D because it is a proxy for growth opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 
1993; Baber, Janakiraman and Kang, 1996) and because it is also a measure of intangible assets which 
affect market valuations (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Lang and Stulz, 1994). Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) also incorporate advertising expenditures as a measure of intangible assets. We also control 
for firm size using assets before the offering because firm value may be a function of firm size. Underwriter 
ranking is important to valuation because it can serve as a signal of firm quality (Booth and Smith, 1986; 
Hughes, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). We 
include the NASDAQ dummy variable because valuations could be sensitive to the listing exchange, perhaps 
because of liquidity differences (Ligon and Liu, 2011).  
In addition to the other control variables, we collect information on the use of offering proceeds from 
prospectuses. If more than 50% of the offering proceeds are not assigned to a particular use (e.g. they are 
to be used for “general corporate purposes”) or are to be used for operating expenditures, we code a dummy 
variable, UseProcOpEx, equal to one and zero otherwise. We are interested in the use of the offering 
proceeds because when management has broad discretion in the application of proceeds, the resulting 
uncertainty may affect valuations. 
Appendix B: Robustness Checks  
We address the possibility that the 2007-2008 financial crisis affects the results reported in Tables 6 and 7 
in two different ways. First, we incorporate a financial crisis dummy, Fin Crisis, into the analyses reported in 
Tables 6 and 7 which is equal to one if the IPO took place between August 2007 and December 2008 and 
zero otherwise.15 The results incorporating the Fin Crisis dummy into the Group 1 (analogous to the results 
in Table 6) and Group 2/3 (analogous to the results in Table 7) regressions are reported in Table B.1 and 
B.2, respectively. The Group 1 results are only slightly altered by the inclusion of the Fin Crisis dummy 
variable. The two changes that are notable are within the large-firm subsample; in the market-to-book value 
regression the Compliance Index loses significance and in the enterprise value-to-sales ratio regression, the 
Post-Reform dummy drops from significant at the 5% level to significant at the 10% level. There are no 
changes in the full sample results and the small-firm results are the same as those reported in Table 6.16 The 
Group 2/3 results likewise change very little. The Compliance Index drops in significance from the 5% to the 
                                                             
15 Alternatively, the financial crisis is defined as occurring between August 2007 and June 2009 and the results are virtually 
identical. 
16 The small-firm subsample results are identical to those reported in Table 6 because only one firm went public during the 
financial crisis in this subsample and that firm happened to be the only one within its two-digit SIC industry. Effectively, this 
analysis just replaced that industry dummy variable with the financial crisis dummy. 
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10% level in the enterprise value-to-sales regression for the full sample and the Post-Reform dummy loses 
significance in the enterprise value-to-sales regression for the large-firm subsample. All other significance 
levels are unaltered and coefficients on the variables change very little. Overall, what we see is that inclusion 
of the financial crisis dummy variable does not materially alter our results or conclusions. 
Second, we exclude the IPOs that occurred during the financial crisis (between August 2007 and December 
2008) as well as their pre-Reform counterparts and redo the analysis. Excluding the financial crisis IPOs and 
their pre-Reform matches from Group 1 eliminates 20 observations from the full sample, two of which come 
from the small-firm subsample and the remaining 18 of which come from the large-firm subsample. Compared 
to the results reported in Table 6, the main differences in the Group 1 results (reported in Table B.3) are that 
the Compliance Index becomes positive and significant at the 10% level in the price-to-earnings regression 
for full sample and small-firm subsample (where it had previously been insignificant) and it loses significance 
in the market-to-book value regression for the large-firm subsample (where it was previously negative and 
significant at the 10% level). There are no differences in the significance levels of the Post-Reform dummy 
variable. 
The results excluding the financial crisis IPOs and their pre-Reform counterparts for Group 2/3 (analogous 
to the results reported in Table 7) are reported in Table B.4. More observations are dropped from Group 2/3 
than Group 1; the full sample for Group 2/3 loses 38 observations, 4 of which come from the small-firm 
subsample and 34 of which come from the large-firm subsample. In the full sample, the Compliance Index 
increases in significance from the 5% to the 1% level in the price-to-sales regression, but loses significance 
in the market-to-book value regression. In the small-firm subsample, the variable loses significance in each 
of the price-to-earnings and extracted valuation factor regressions, where it had been negative and significant 
at the 5% level in the main analysis. In the large-firm subsample, the Compliance Index becomes positive 
and significant at the 10% level in the price-to-earnings regression, but negative and significant at the 10% 
level in the enterprise value-to-EBITDA regression and at the 5% level in the enterprise value-to-sales 
regression. In the full sample results, the Post-Reform variable loses significance in the market-to-book value 
regression, but becomes negative and significant at the 5% level in the enterprise value-to-sales regression. 
In the small-firm subsample results, it drops in significance from the 5% level to the 10% level in the price-
to-earnings regression and from the 1% to the 5% level in the extracted valuation factor regression (both 
negative coefficients). Interestingly, it is not just the negative coefficients that drop in significance. The 
coefficients on the Post-Reform variable are positive, but less significant in the enterprise value-to-EBITDA 
regression (dropping from significance at the 1% level to the 5% level) and enterprise value-to-sales 
regression (dropping from significance at the 5% level to completely insignificant). Finally, in the large-firm 
subsample, the Post-Reform variable loses significance in the large-firm subsample. 
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